Abstract

One c r u c i a l a r g u m e n t a g a i n s t t h e o b j e c t i v i t y o f s o c i a l s c i e n c e s p u r p o r t s t o s h o w t h a t t h e o b j e c t i v i t h e s o c i a l s c i e n c e s i s c o m p r o m i s e d b y t h e d e s c r i p t i s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s g i v e o f s o c i a l p h e n o m e n a . T h e a r t h a t ( 1 ) i f s o c i a l s c i e n c e i s o b j e c t i v e , t h e n t h e d t i o n s s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s g i v e o f s o c i a l p h e n o m e n a do m i t th e m t o v a l u e j u d g m e n t s . B u t ( 2 ) , s i n c e t h e d e t i o n s s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s g i v e o f s o c i a l p h e n o m e n a do th e m t o v a l u e j u d g m e n t s , t h e n ( 3 ) s o c i a l s c i e n c e i s j e c t i v e . T h i s a r g u m e n t i s s h o w n t o b e u n s o u n d . A f t i n g u i s h i n g s e v e r a l s e n s e s o f " c o m m i t " i t i s m a i n t a v a r i o u s a r g u m e n t s f o r t h e s e c o n d p r e m i s e f a i l . F u r i t i s m a i n t a i n e d t h a t e v e n i f t h e s e a r g u m e n t s w e r e f u l v a l u e c o m m i t m e n t c o u l d b e a v o i d e d . F i n a l l y , i t t h a t e v e n i f v a l u e c o m m i t m e n t c o u l d n o t b e a v o i d e d , j e c t i v i t y o f t h e s o c i a l s c i e n c e s w o u l d n o t b e c o m p r a n d c o n s e q u e n t l y t h e f i r s t p r e m i s e o f t h e a r g u m e n t t h e t y o f o n s g u m e n t i s e s c r i pn o t c o ms c r i pc o m m it no t o bt e r d i si n e d t h a t t h e r m o r e , s u c c e s si s s h o w n t h e o bom i s e d i s f a l s e .
Description and Objectivity
One c r u c i a l a t t a c k a g a i n s t t h e o b j e c t i v i t y o f t h e s o c i a l s c i e n c e s i s b y m e a n s o f an a r g u m e n t t h a t p u r p o r t s t o s h o w t h a t t h e o b j e c t i v i t y o f t h e s o c i a l s c i e n c e s i s c o m p r o m i s e d b y t h e d e s c r i p t i o n s s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s g i v e o f s o c i a l p h e n o m e n a . I n t h i s p a p e r t h e a t t a c k w i l l b e c r i t i c a l l y c o n s i d e r e d . T h i s a r g u m e n t c a n b e s t a t e d a s f o l l o w s : ( 1 ) I f s o c i a l s c i e n c e i s o b j e c t i v e , t h e n t h e d e s c r i p t i o n s s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s g i v e o f s o c i a l p h e n o m e n a do n o t c o m m it th e m t o v a l u e j u d g m e n t s . ( 2 ) B u t t h e d e s c r i p t i o n s s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s g i v e o f s o c i a l p h e n o m e n a do c o m m it th em t o v a l u e j u d g m e n t s . ( 3 ) • -S o c i a l s c i e n c e i s n o t o b j e c t i v e .
Now c r i t i c s o f t h e o b j e c t i v i t y o f t h e s o c i a l s c i e n c e s h a v e h e l d p r e m i s e ( 1 ) b e c a u s e t h e y h a v e s u p p o s e d t h a t v a l u e j u d g m e n t s a r e n o t o b j e c t i v e ; t h a t s u c h j u d g m e n t s a r e n o t c a p a b l e o f r a t i o n a l d e f e n s e . We w i l l e x a m i n e t h i s a s s u m p t i o n a s w e p r o c e e d . T h e e v a l u a t i o n o f p r e m i s e s
( 1 ) a n d
w i l l t u r n on t h e m e a n i n g o f " c o m m i t m e n t t o v a l u e j u d g m e n t s . " C l e a r l y an a r g u m e n t c o n t a i n i n g p r e m i s e s ( l a ) a n d ( 2 a ) w o u l d b e m u ch m o r e c h a l l e n g i n g t h a n an a r g u m e n t c o n t a i n i n g p r e m i s e s ( l b ) a n d ( 2 b ) . 
C o n s e q u e n t l y w e w i l l c o n s i d e r v a r i o u s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f t h i s e x p r e s s i o n . F i r s t , h o w e v e r , an a m b i g u i t y s h o u l d b e n o t e d i n p r e m i s e ( 1 ) . T h e p h r a s e " t h e d e s c r i p t i o n s s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s g i v e o f s o c i a l p h e n o m e n a " c o u l d r e f e r t o d e s c r i p t i o n s s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s g i v e a n y s o c i a l p h e n o m e n a o r i t c o u l d r e f e r t o t h e d e s c r i p t i o n s s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s g i v e so m e p a r t i c u l a r s o c i a l p h e n o m e n a , s a y s o c i a l p h e n o m e n a o f t y p e T . O n c e t h i s am b i g u i t y i s m ad e e x p l i c i t w e h a v e tw o d i f f e r e n t a r g u m e n t s w i t h d i f f e r e n t f i r s t p r e m i s e s : ( l a ) I f s o c i a l s c i e n c e i s o b j e c t i v e , t h e n t h e d e s c r i p t i o n s s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s g i v e o f a n y s o c i a l p h e n o m e n a do n o t c o m m it th e m t o v a l u e j u d g m e n t s . ( l b ) I f s o c i a l s c i e n c e i s o b j e c t i v e , t h e n t h e d e s c r i p t i o n s s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s g i v e o f s o c i a l p h e n o m e n a o f t y p e T do n o t c o m m it th e m t o v a l u e j u d g m e n t s . T h i s a m b i g u i t y w o u l d a f f e c t t h e s e c o n d p r e m i s e o f t h e a r g u m e n t a n d w o u l d y i e l d : ( 2 a ) B u t t h e d e s c r i p t i o n s s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s g i v e o f a n y s o c i a l
An a n a l o g o u s m o v e i s h a r d l y o p e n t o u s i n t h e c a s e o ( 2 a ) . S o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s do n o t h a v e t h e o p t i o n
A n d s u p p o s e t h a t (A ) e n t a i l s t h e v a l u e j u d g m e n t : ( B ) X i s g o o d .
T h e n o n e c a n s a y v a l u e j u d g m e n t . 
t i s t S i s c o m m i t t e d i n t h e a b s t r a c t l o g i c a l s e n s e t o (B ) b e c a u s e o f (A ) . S u p p o s e f u r t h e r t h a t S b e l i e v e s t h a t (D) a s w e l l a s ( A ) . T h e n S s h o u l d
H o w e v e r , w h e t h e r s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s a r e c o m m i t t e d t o v a l u e j u d g m e n t s i n t h e a b s t r a c t l o g i c a l s e n s e d e p e n d s t o a c e r t a i n e x t e n t on w h a t s o r t o f v a l u e j u d g m e n t o n e i s t a l k i n g a b o u t . F o r e x a m p l e , a s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t w ho d e s c r i b e s a l e g a l s y s t e m m ay b e c o m m i t t e d t o c e r t a i n j u d g m e n t s o f l e g a l o b l i g a t i o n . B u t s u c h a d e s c r i p t i o n w o u l d n o t n e c e s s a r i l y c o m m it h im t o a n y j u d g m e n t o f m o r a l o b l i g a t i o n . F o r , i n g e n e r a l , j u d g m e n t s o f l e g a l d u t y e n t a i l n o t h i n g a b o u t m o r a l d u t y . M o r e o v e r , a d e s c r i p t i o n o f a p a r t i c u l a r a c t m ay c o m m it a s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t t o a j u d g m e n t o f p r i m a f a c i e m o r a l o b l i g a t i o n w i t h o u t t h e s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t b e i n g c o m m i t t e d t o a j u d g m e n t o f a c t u a l m o r a l o b l i g a t i o n . I n o r d e r t o d e r i v e s t a t e m e n t s o f a c t u a l d u t y f r o m s t a t e m e n t s o f p r i m a f a c i e d u t y o n e m u s t a l s o a s s u m e t h a t o t h e r t h i n g s a r e e q u a l . F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e d e s c r i p t i o n o f an i n s t i t u t i o n a s h a v i n g s u c h a n d s u c h a f u n c t i o n m ay e n t a i l t h a t i t i s a g o o d i n s t i t u t i o n f o r a c e r t a i n p u r p o s e , i . e . t h a t i t h a s i n s t r u m e n t a l v a l u e i n p r o d u c i n g s u c h a n d s u c h r e s u l t s . B u t t h e r e i s n o t h i n g i n t h i s d e s c r i p t i o n w h i c h e n t a i l s t h a t t h e i n s t i t u t i o n i s i n t r i n s i c a l l y g o o d . H e n c e , a s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t who u s e s s u c h a d e s c r i p t i o n w o u l d n o t b e c o m m i t t e d t o a j u d g m e n t o f i n t r i n s i c v a l u e . A s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t m ay b e c o m m i t t e d t o a h y p o t h e t i c a l v a l u e j u d g m e n t " I f g r a t u i t o u s s u f f e r i n g o f a n i m a l s i s w r o n g , t h e n v i v i s e c t i o n i s w r o n g " w i t h o u t b e i n g c o m m i t t e d i n t h e a b s t r a c t l o g i c a l s e n s e t o e i t h e r t h e c a t e g o r i c a l j u d g m e n t t h a t v i v i s e c t i o n i s w r o n g o r g r a t u i t o u s s u f f e r i n g o f a n i m a l s i s w r o n g . T h e i m p o r t a n c e o f t h e a b o v e p o i n t t o o u r d i s c u s s i o n o f o b j e c t i v i t y i s t h i s : W h a t s o r t o f v a l u e j u d g m e n t o n e i s t a l k i n g a b o u t i s c r u c i a l f o r t h e q u e s t i o n o f w h e t h e r t h e j u d g m e n t s a r e c a p a b l e o f r a t i o n a l d e f e n s e . F o r e x a m p l e , I w i l l a r g u e l a t e r t h a t j u d g m e n t s o f i n s t r u m e n t a l v a l u e a r e c a p a b l e o f r a t i o n a l d e f e n s e e v e n t h o u g h a r g u m e n t s o f i n t r i n s i c v a l u e m ay n o t b e ; I w i l l a r g u e t h a t j u d g m e n t s o f l e g a l o b l i g a t i o n a r e c a p a b l e o f r a t i o n a l d e f e n s e e v e n t h o u g h j u d g m e n t s o f m o r a l o b l i g a t i o n m ay n o t b e . I w i l l m a i n t a i n t h a t c e r t a i n h y p o t h e t i c a l
One m u s t d e t e r m i n e w h a t s o r t o f v a l u e j u d g m e n t t h e s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t i s c o m m i t t e d t o .
One o f t h e f e w p h i l o s o p h e r s o f s c i e n c e t o d i s c u s s t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s a r e c o m m i t t e d t o v a l u e j u d g m e n t v i a t h e i r d e s c r i p t i o n s i s E r n e s t N a g e l . N a g e l d i s t i n g u i s h e s b e t w e e n tw o t y p e s o f v a l u e j u d g m e n t s . He a r g u e s t h a t t h e r e a r e " t w o q u i t e d i f f e r e n t s e n s e s o f t h e t e r m ' v a l u e j u d g m e n t ' : t h e s e n s e i n w h i c h a v a l u e j u d g m e n t e x p r e s s e s a p p r o v a l o r d i s a p p r o v a l e i t h e r o f so m e m o r a l ( o r s o c i a l ) i d e a l , o r o f so m e a c t i o n ( o r i n s t i t u t i o n ) b e c a u s e o f a c o m m i t m e n t t o s u c h an i d e a l : a n d t h e s e n s e i n w h i c h a v a l u e j u d g m e n t e x p r e s s e s an e s t i m a t e o f t h e d e g r e e to w h i c h so m e c o m m o n ly r e c o g n i z e d ( a n d m o r e o r l e s s c l e a r l y d e f i n e d ) t y p e o f a c t i o n , o b j e c t , o r i n s t i t u t i o n i s e m b o d i e d i n a g i v e n instance." 1 T h e f i r s t t y p
N a g e l ' s d i s t i n c t i o n i s no d o u b t a u s e f u l o n e . H o w e v e r , i t d o e s n o t s h o w , a s h e s e e m s t o t h i n k i t d o e s , t h a t t h e u s e o f d e s c r i p t i v e s t a t e m e n t s ( w h a t h e c a l l s c h a r a c t e r i z i n g v a l u e j u d g m e n t s ) b y s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s d o e s n o t c o m m it t h e m t o v a l u e j u d g m e n t s . F o r N a g e l ' s m a j o r p o i n t s e e m s t o b e t h a t a s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t c a n u s e a c h a r a c t e r i z i n g v a l u e j u d g m e n t w i t h o u t t h e
Y o r k : d i s a p p r o v a l ( w i t h o u t u s i n g an a p p r a i s i n g v a l u e j u d g m e n t ) . T h i s , a s w e h a v e s e e n , i s c e r t a i n l y c o r r e c t . A s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t c a n u s e a n y d e s c r i p t i v e s t a t e m e n t w i t h o u t h a v i n g -l e t a l o n e e x p r e s s i n g b y t h e u s e o f t h i s s t a t e m e n t --
H o w e v e r , o n c e t h i s i s a d m i t t e d i t i s s t i l l p o s s i b l e t h a t a s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t m i g h t b e c o m m i t t e d t o v a l u e j u d g m e n t s b y t h e u s e o f h i s d e s c r i p t i v e s t a t e m e n t s . A s w e h a v e s e e n , a s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t c a n u s e a d e s c r i p t i v e s t a t e m e n t ( w h a t N a g e l c a l l s a c h a r a c t e r i z i n g v a l u e j u d g m e n t ) a n d b e c o m m i t t e d t o a v a l u e j u d g m e n t i n t h e a b s t r a c t l o g i c a l s e n s e , i n t h e r a t i o n a l c o g n i t i v e s e n s e a n d i n t h e r a t i o n a l a f f e c t i v e s e n s e . T h i s i s p e r f e c t l y c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t ' s n o t e x p r e s s i n g a p p r o v a l o r d i s a p p r o v a l b y t h e u s e o f a s t a t e m e n t ; t h a t i s , w i t h h i s n o t m a k i n g w h a t N a g e l c a l l s an a p p r a i s i n g v a l u e j u d g m e n t .
A n A r g u m e n t F o r P r e m i s e ( 2 a ) 
So f a r w e h a v e c o n s i d e r e d a g e n e r a l a r g u m e n t t h a t p u r p o r t s t o s h o w t h a t s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s a r e n o t o b j e c t i v e b e c a u s e t h e i r d e s c r i p t i o n s o f s o c i a l p h e n o m e n a c o m m it th e m to v a l u e j u d g m e n t s . U n d e r a n a l y s i s t h i s a r g u m e n t b e c a m e tw o a r g u m e n t s d e p e n d i n g o n how o n e i n t e r p r e t e d t h e p r e m i s e s . On t h e s t r o n g e s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e a r g u m e n t , s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s w e r e c o m m i t t e d t o v a l u e j u d g m e n t s b y t h e i r d e s c r i p t i o n s o f a n y s o c i a l p h e n o m e n a . T h u s , p r e m i s e ( 2 ) o f t h e a r g u m e n t b e c o m e s u n d e r t h i s s t r o n g i n t e r p r e t a t i o n : ( 2 a ) B u t t h e d e s c r i p t i o n s s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s g i v e
I t s h o u l d b e s t r e s s e d t h a t ( 4 ) e n t a i l s ( 5 ) ( u n l i k e t h e e x a m p l e s w e c o n s i d e r e d a b o v e ) w i t h o u t t h e a d d i t i o n o f a n y h i d d e n p r e m i s e s a b o u t t h e s e m a n t i c r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n d e s c r i p t i v e t e r m s a n d e v a l u a t i v e t e r m s ;
t h e e n t a i l m e n t d e p e n d s e n t i r e l y on t h e f o r m o f t h e s t a t e m e n t . C o n s e q u e n t l y a n y s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t u s i n g a s t a t e m e n t One might suppose that social scientists could avoid this abstract logical commitment by not using statements of the form "All A 's are B" and restricting themselves to singular statements.
However, this is not so. Consider a singular statement which says that some particular item a has property P.
It can be shown that this statement entails "If all things which are P are G, then a is G" where G is any evalu ative term at all.
A similar result can be demonstrated for existential statements and statistical statements. w i l l b e e i t h e r a s i n g u l a r s t a t e m e n t , a n e x i s t e n t i a l s t a t e m e n t , a g e n e r a l s t a t e m e n t , o r a s t a t i s t i c a l s t a t e m e n t a n d 
i t h r e s p e c t t o w h a t t h e d e s c r i p t i v e s t a t e m e n t s a r e a b o u t . C o n s i d e r t h e f o l l o w i n g d e s c r i p t i v e s t a t e m e n t f r o m t h e n a t u r a l s c i e n c e s . ( 7 ) O b j e c t a w e i g h s t h r e e g r a m s . T h i s s t a t e m e n t e n t a i l s : ( 8 ) I f e v e r y t h i n g t h a t w e i g h s t h r e e g r a m s i s i n t r i n s i c a l l y g o o d , t h e n o b j e c t a i s i n t r i n s i c a l l y g o o d .
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Secondly even if all social scientists did disapprove of authoritarian traits or persons it would not follow that when they said "X was authoritarian" they were thereby com mitted to the value judgment, "X is morally bad or un-
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Such a premise or one similar to it seems to be ab solutely essential for the inference to succeed. However, this is just to say that (A1) does not by itself entail (Bf) unless it is combined with a moral premise. Further more, premise (Cf) does not seem to be analytic. There does not seem to be any contradiction in saying that the tendency to be on the look out for, to condemn, reject and punish people who violate conventional values is benevolent.
Consider now the rationa There is nothing in the nat gest that a social scientis ritarian would fail to be r that X is morally bad: For there is no semantic link b "is morally bad." 1 cognitive sense of commitment, ure of the case that would sugt who believed that X is authoational if he did not believe example, he might believe that etween "is authoritarian" and The same thing is true about the rational affective sense of commitment.
A social scientist who believed that X is autho ritarian would not necessarily be irrational if he did not disapprove of X.
For example, he might not believe that there is any semantic link between "is authoritarian" and "is morally bad." Consequently, he would not believe that X is morally bad and thus not disapprove of X.
Moreover, even if a social scientist did have a feeling of disapproval toward X, there might be nothing in his belief that X is authoritarian that made his feeling of disapproval a rational outcome of his particular belief.
Consequently, it is not inconsistent for a social scientist who disapproves of an authoritarian trait or person to say "X is authoritarian: however, nothing I have said so far indicates whether I should believe that X is morally bad or whether I should feel disapproval toward X." 
Mackenzie's Argument
A different argument is given by Mackenzie. He argues that when one describes someone as president of B Club --a club for collecting butterflies --this entails that the person described has certain rights and obligations and this in turn commits the person who is describing to certain value judgments:
''For to say that Jones is the president is to imply that Jones has certain rights and obligations since this is partly how the office of president is defined. And to say by implication, that one has rights and obligations is assuredly to make a statement that has value content. That this is not so can easily be seen if one imagines that Club B is a club -not for collecting butterflies -but for torturing old ladies.
Surely in this case no prima facie obligation is created to carry out the duties of the office.
Such prima facie obligation is inferable only with the addition of some other moral premise, e.g. Hence, the use of (20) does not commit social scientists in the abstract logical sense to any judgments of moral obligation.
To be sure, use of (20) may commit the social scientist to value judgments of quasilegal obligation.
But as we shall see later there is no problem in rationally defending these judgments.
Searle's Argument
Another argument that can be used to show that the de scriptions given by social scientists of social phenomena commit them to value judgments is that of John Searle.® Searle argues that the statement: Other things are equal when one knows no reason why Jones need not pay.
They argue that on this interpretation (26a) does not entail (27) when combined with (26b) and (26a). This is because (26), (26a) and (26b) might be true and (27) false if there was some unknown stronger obliga tion that Jones had which conflicted with Jones' obligation to pay.
According to the Thompsons, what is needed to carry off the deduction of (27) is a stronger interpretation of (26a), namely:
If other things are equal, then there is no conclusive reason to think that it is false that Jones ought to pay.
But on such an interpretation of (26a), (26a) is not a purely factual statement; for there is no conclusive reason to think that it is false that Jones ought not pay just in case Jones has no stronger obligation that conflicts with his obligation to pay.
However, to say Jones has no 9 James and Judith Thompson, "How Not to Derive 'Ought" from 'Is,'" Philosophical Review LXXIII, 1964, pp. 512-516. stronger obligation is to make a value judgment. Thus (26a) must not be interpreted in a purely descriptive way in order to deduce (27).
The Thompsons' argument is correct.
But it does not show that some value judgments cannot be derived from (23). (26') Goebbels is under an obligation to kill five million
Jews .
But such a result is surely absurd. Neither Goebbels nor any one else could have a prima facie obligation to commit an outrageous immoral act.
This suggests that Searle's deduc tion of (26) goes through only with the tacit assumption that paying Jones five dollars is not an outrageously im moral act.
However, once made explicit, this premise is surely not analytic:
whether paying Jones five dollars is morally outrageous will depend in part on the consequences of so doing and these consequences are not known a priori.
Hence, Searle's argument fails to show that statements of prima fac ie duty can be deduced from purely descriptive statements.
The Avoidance of Value Commitments
Suppose we grant all of the above arguments. Perhaps value commitment could still be avoided. M^seems to urge that, e.g. promise-making behavior not be avoided in social science investigation.
M 2 urges that it should be.
If one does not avoid certain investigations one forsakes objectivity, if one does avoid these investigations one seems to forsake the spirit of free inquiry. Neither course of action seems desirable.
The question seems to come down to which alternative is the least undesirable.
But this question, it should be noted, is a value question. Whether it admits of any rational answer will depend on whether value judgments can be rationally defended.
However, so far we have taken it for granted that the only way to avoid value commitment in the abstract logical sense was to avoid description of certain kinds of phenomena, e.g. the phenomena of promise-making. Indeed, the above discussion of the price involved in avoiding this commiment presumed this.
However, this presupposition seems to be mistaken.
For one is not committed in the abstract logi cal sense for example simply because one describes a parti cular kind of phenomena.
Rather one is committed because one describes it in a certain way, using one mode of descrip tion rather than another, words in one sense rather than in another and so on. To be sure, the use of the oratio obliqua way of describ ing may have certain disadvantages.
But if the alternative is to use language that commits one to certain value judg ments and thus to lack of objectivity the disadvantage may be worth the price.
In any case, using this mode of descrip tion certainly seems preferable to not describing the phe-' nomena at all in order to avoid lack of objectivity. For if social scien tists change the meaning of the term "authoritarian" in or der to avoid value commitment this means that they cannot talk about what they want to talk about; they must necessar ily be referring to different phenomena from those which they usually refer to when they use the term "authoritarian." How ever, this objection is mistaken.
A change in the meaning of a term does not necessarily entail a change in the referent of the term.
It is possible to change the meaning of "autho ritarian" yet keep the same referent the term had before the change. It is an empirical such a test T could be constructed. But there seems to be no a priori reason to not, the objectionable value commitment of itarian" is avoided.
In any case, the above considerations suggest that (2b) as it stands is false and needs to be changed.
(2b) should be replaced by: (2bf) But the descriptions social scientists give of social phenomena of type T commit them to value judgments if they describe this sort of phe nomena in a certain way.
One can escape from value commitment not only be avoiding the description of certain social phenomena but by avoiding certain ways of describing them, avoiding certain meanings of terms, and so on.
This suggests that the price that one pays for value freedom and hence objectivity may be much less than we originally supposed.
For objectivity is not necessarily bought at the price of forsaking M^.
One can investigate all social phenomena without fear of value com mitment in any important sense of commitment if one uses only certain modes of expression and terms understood in cer tain ways.
Thus principle M and principle M2 are compatible. One can avoid procedures that lead to lack of objectivity and still be able to investigate all scientific phenomena so long as one describes them in certain ways. So far we have considered ways in which a social sci entist might avoid commitment to value judgments.
As a result we have seen how premise (2bf) can be defeated by different descriptions.
The time has come to challenge premise (lb). As suggested earlier this premise rests on the supposition that value judgments are not capable of rational defense.
We need not argue here that value judg ments are always rationally defensible.
Our argument will pose a dilemma for the advocates of the argument considéré in this paper.
Social scientists either are or are not committed in the abstract logical sense to certain value judgments because of their descriptions:
If they are com mitted, the value judgments are rationally defensible; if they are not committed, then even if the value judgments cannot be rationally defended, the objectivity of the so cial sciences is not affected.
In other words, I will argue that the critics cannot have it both ways. They cannot maintain that social scientists are committed to value judgments via their descriptions and also maintain that these value judgments are not rationally defensible.
Certain types of value judgments can be easily shown to be rationally defensible. Moreover, there is every reason to think that (29) is a rationally defensible statement.
Whether it is defensible to claim that Jones signed a contract will depend on various legal factors, e.g. the number of witnesses, whether Jones has not been drugged, the age of Jones and so on.
But all of these factors are capable of rational determination and indeed are arguable in courts of law. If Mackenzie is right, one can establish whether Jones has certain obli gations merely by determining whether Jones is president. There may be nothing difficult about this.
How someone becomes president of a club is often specified in the by laws of the club.
Suppose that Club B fs by-laws state that someone is president of Club B if he is elected by a major ity of the members of the Club who are present at the Sum mer meeting of the Club.
Then we could well claim that Jones has certain obligations connected with being president of Club B if we had good grounds to suppose that Jones was elected in the manner specified in the by-laws. But whether something is helpful in ng else about or whether something brings else seems to be a straight-forward factual an be answered by appeal to evidence, argue.
Judgments
For example, the claim that a particular s good presumably means good with respect to iven some definition of cure.
The person claim need not suppose that cures are good even that cures when defined in this way are e.
But this claim is just to say that this s helpful in bringing about cures. Whether a difficult but rationally determinable It has been argued in recent years that functional statements in the social sciences commit social scientists to certain value judgments, in particular, that functional statements commit social scientists to the desirability of the status quo, the present make-up of society.
The analysis of function statements is a difficult topic. -25-it will not be necessary to discuss this here. For functional statements, whatever they mean, at most only entail judgments of instrumental value.
To say that thë function of magic is to preserve tribal harmony may entail (31) Magic is good for preserving tribal harmony.
Furthermore, it might be argued that when correctly under stood, (31) may entail (32) Preserving tribal harmony is good for maintaining the status quo.
But neither of these judgments presumes that preserving tribal harmony is intrinsically good or that the status quo is intrinsically good.
They only say that magic and pre serving tribal harmony are useful for bringing about cer tain ends.
Whether these ends are good intrinsically or even instrumentally good for other ends is not presumed.
However, the traditional concern about the rational defensibility of value judgments has not focussed on judgments of legal obligation or judgments of instrumental value. The crucial question has always been the rational defensibility of judgments of moral value, judgments of intrinsic nonmoral value and judgments of moral obligation -especially the latter two types of judgments.
Traditionally, the dominant objective position in ethics has been naturalism, the view that value judgments, e.g. judgments of moral obligation and judgments of intrinsic value are derivable --usually via definitionsfrom fac tual descriptive statements.^3
Critics of naturalism have admitted that if these sorts of value judgments could be derived from factual descriptive statements, they would be rationally defensible and objective.
But critics of natu ralism have argued that such statements could not be so derived.
One of the major ironies of the present discussion is that the critique of objectivity in the social sciences under consideration seems to be committed to a from of naturalism in ethics.
The claim is that social scientists are committed to value judgments via their descriptive 13 Frankena, Ethics, Chapter 6.
